The evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods game with conditional peer exclusion.
Social exclusion can prevent free riders from participating in social activities and deprive them of sharing cooperative benefits, which is an effective mechanism for the evolution of cooperation. However, traditional peer-exclusion strategies are unconditional, and as long as there are defectors in the group, they will pay a cost to exclude the defectors. In reality, one of the reasons for the complexity of these strategies is that individuals may react differently depending on the environment in which they are located. Based on this consideration, we introduce a kind of conditional peer-exclusion strategy in the spatial public goods game model. Specifically, the behavior of conditional exclusion depends on the number of defectors in the group and can be adjusted by a tolerance parameter. Only if the number of defectors in the group exceeds the tolerance threshold, conditional exclusion can be triggered to exclude defectors. We explore the effects of parameters such as tolerance, exclusion cost, and probability of exclusion success on the evolution of cooperation. Simulation results confirmed that conditional exclusion can greatly reduce the threshold values of the synergy factor above which cooperation can emerge. Especially, when the tolerance is low, very small synergy factors can promote the population to achieve a high level of cooperation. Moreover, even if the probability of exclusion success is low, or the unit exclusion cost is relatively high, conditional exclusion is effective in promoting cooperation. These results allow us to better understand the role of exclusion strategies in the emergence of cooperation.